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Introduction by Scott Kaufman, Francis Marion University

T

he 1970s, the decade once referred to as “lost,”

[1]

during which, in the words of

[2]
Bruce Carroll, “It seemed like nothing happened,”
have undergone a much-needed
reassessment. Because much of the primary documentation related to U.S. foreign policy
was classified, the first monographs to take that second look at the seventies focused
[3]
primarily on domestic matters.
The declassification process, including the publication of
volumes of Foreign Relations of the United States for the Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and
Jimmy Carter administrations, has allowed scholars to expand the historiography of the
[4]
seventies to America’s diplomacy.
Matthew Ambrose’s The Control Agenda is part of that
trend.
Ambrose offers an overview of U.S. arms control policy from the late 1960s until the early
1980s, focusing on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Because this effort was led
by top-level U.S. officials (and their counterparts in the Soviet Union) it is they who draw
the author’s greatest attention. Tracing the genesis of SALT to the Lyndon Johnson
administration, he follows the talks to the signing and ratification of the first SALT
agreement in 1972, the attempt by the Ford and Carter administrations to achieve SALT II,
and the tabling of the second SALT agreement following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan
in 1979. Yet despite the failure to ratify it, SALT II influenced the Intermediate Nuclear
Forces (INF) negotiations during the Ronald Reagan administration. It was only with the
collapse of those talks in 1983 that the SALT process came to an end and the United States
adopted a new foundation for its arms control initiatives.
The four reviewers in this roundtable are unanimous that Ambrose’s book is well-written
and researched. Ambrose “takes a highly technical, complex subject,” writes Luke Nichter,
“and makes it palatable for a more general readership.” John Maurer declares the
monograph “an important contribution to the history of the Cold War,” while David Tal
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refers to it as “finely articulated.” Both Maurer and Ronald Granieri cite Ambrose’s use of
recently-declassified materials in telling the story of SALT. Although they point to the fact
that Ambrose covers a lengthy time period in only about 220 pages of text, the reviewers
believe this does not detract from the book’s value. The “broad brush strokes” on which
Ambrose relies, comments Tal, means one finds “more forest here than trees – and that is
not necessarily a bad thing.”
But there is forest, and here too the reviewers find much to praise. Both Maurer and
Granieri note that there was a close relationship between the SALT process on the one
hand, and domestic politics and public opinion on the other, though Nichter would have
liked to have seen more on this score. Readers will find particularly rich details on the
negotiations during the Carter years, Maurer writes, which allows one to better understand
the complexity of the issues confronting Reagan when he took office in 1981.
At the same time, the reviewers saw opportunities for greater clarity and stronger analysis.
The strongest criticisms come from Tal, who disagrees with Ambrose on how long President
Richard Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger sought to link SALT to the
broader goal of détente; believes that Ambrose exaggerates the importance of U.S.
negotiator Paul Nitze to the SALT process; and argues that Ambrose downplays the
significance of the backchannel talks between Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the
United States Anatoly Dobrynin. But the biggest dissimilarity between his interpretation of
the SALT process and that of Ambrose, writes Tal, is historiographical. Ambrose sees “SALT
as flawed” because of the level of arms reductions achieved. To Tal, though, SALT was not
about reductions or limitations to weapons, but an effort to stop the arms race and stabilize
the international system. That stability was of importance to the negotiators is something
that Granieri also addresses. Maurer for his part is not fully convinced by Ambrose’s
assertion that SALT changed the way in which the United States used its nuclear arsenal to
target Soviet military sites.
Tal also believes that the author could have mined other collections, including documents at
the Nixon Presidential Library, the National Archives, and the digital documents declassified
by the National Security Archive. Through further research, comments Tal, Ambrose would
have had a better understanding of the extent of Nixon’s commitment to SALT. Nichter
seconds Tal to some extent, expressing his wish that Ambrose had consulted the Nixon
tapes and conducted interviews with players in the SALT talks. Granieri and Maurer note
the lack of Soviet materials, but they add that this is due primarily to the fact that they are
not available. Indeed, Maurer argues that “Given the dearth of Soviet sources, Ambrose’s
emphasis is rightly on American SALT policy.”
Despite the aforementioned weaknesses, The Control Agenda represents a valuable
contribution to the historiography of U.S. arms control policy, and to American diplomacy
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during the 1970s and early 1980s. Ambrose provides policymakers, scholars, and laypersons
a clearer understanding of the difficulties in achieving nuclear arms control accords at a
time when the 2010 New START agreement signed between the United States and Russia is
set to expire in 2021, when President Donald Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action signed with Iran, and tensions with North Korea over
denuclearization of the Korean peninsula persist. The Control Agenda is “a serious and
thoughtful book,” concludes Granieri, one “that deserves a wide audience within the
ongoing scholarly dialogue about the efforts to forestall Armageddon.”
Participants:
Matthew Ambrose earned his Ph.D. in History from The Ohio State University. He has
previously worked in the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Historical Office and is
currently a Senior Defense Analyst at the Government Accountability Office. The views and
opinions expressed here do not necessarily reflect the views of GAO, the legislative branch,
or the U.S. government.
Scott Kaufman received his Ph.D. in History at Ohio University, and currently is a Board of
Trustees Research Scholar and Chair of the Department of History at Francis Marion
University. He is author, co-author, or editor of twelve books, including Plans Unraveled:
The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration (Northern Illinois University Press, 2008),
Project Plowshare: The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Explosives in Cold War America (Cornell
University Press, 2013), Ambition, Pragmatism, and Party: A Political Biography of Gerald R.
Ford (University Press of Kansas, 2017), and The Environment and International
History (Bloomsbury, 2018). He is currently working on a comparative history of the
Panama and Suez Canals.
Ronald J. Granieri is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for the Study of America
and the West at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in Philadelphia, as well as Director of
Research at the Lauder Institute at the University of Pennsylvania. A graduate of
Harvard and the University of Chicago, Dr. Granieri has also worked as a Contract Historian
for the Department of Defense. His most recent publications include: “Beyond Cap the Foil:
Caspar Weinberger and the Reagan Era Defense Buildup,” in Bradley Coleman and Kyle
Longley, eds., The Enduring Legacy: Leadership and National Security Affairs during the
Reagan Presidency. (University of Kentucky Press, 2017): 51-80.
John Maurer is the Henry A. Kissinger Postdoctoral Fellow at International Security
Studies and the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale University. His current book
project focuses on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) in the Nixon Administration,
drawing on the Kissinger Papers at Yale to examine how academic ideas on the nature and
purpose of arms control shaped U.S. arms control policy. He has a Ph.D. in history from
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Georgetown University.
Luke A. Nichter is a Professor of History at Texas A&M University–Central Texas. His
books include Richard Nixon and Europe: The Reshaping of the Postwar Atlantic World
(Cambridge University Press), the New York Times bestseller The Nixon Tapes: 1971-1972
(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt), The Nixon Tapes: 1973 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt), and the
forthcoming Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. and the Decline of the Eastern Establishment (Yale
University Press).
David Tal is the Yossi Harel Chair in Modern Israel Studies at the University of Sussex
(UK). He authored two books on nuclear disarmament and arms control: US Strategic Arms
Policy in the Cold War: Negotiation and Confrontation over SALT, 1969-79 (London:
Routledge, 2017) and The American Nuclear Disarmament Dilemma, 1945-1963 (Syracuse:
Syracuse University Press, 2008). He is writing now a book on U.S.-Israel Relationship (The
Making of an Alliance: The Origins and Development of the US-Israel Relationship), under
contract with Cambridge University Press.
Review by Ronald J. Granieri, Foreign Policy Research Institute
The Journey or the Destination? Arms Control in the SALT Era

T

he Control Agenda offers a cogent, well-researched history of the Strategic Arms

Limitation Talks (SALT) which should take up a worthy place within the growing literature
on the late Cold War. Matthew Ambrose traces the rise and fall of the ‘SALT Process,’ which
includes not only the negotiations of particular agreements, but also the politics and habits
of mind that developed around Soviet-American arms control, from the late Johnson to the
early Reagan Administrations.
Ambrose’s focus differs subtly but significantly from other works covering years between
1969 and 1983. This is not a history of détente per se, though the narrative overlaps with
the détente era. Rather, Ambrose treats arms control as an issue in itself, outlining the
emergence of a particular consensus that emerged between the Superpowers, “an approach
to nuclear arms negotiations that featured a relatively static strategic balance, a focus on
offensive forces, and weak or passive means of verification” (211). Within that framework,
the superpowers pursued ongoing bilateral negotiations about nuclear weapons, producing
first the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the Framework agreement that made up
SALT I in 1972, then the more detailed (but ultimately doomed) SALT II Treaty by 1979.
According to Ambrose, that consensus even survived the crisis of détente in 1979-1980,
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where the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Iran crisis, combined with the election of
President Ronald Reagan, presaged the return of Cold War tensions. As Ambrose argues in
his concluding chapter, Reagan entered office initially prepared to continue negotiations on
intermediate nuclear weapons within the SALT framework. Those negotiations, conceived
within NATO’s ‘two-track’ decision in parallel with plans to modernize NATO’s nuclear
weapons in Western Europe, eventually broke down with the arrival of the 1983 deadline for
deploying Pershing II and Cruise Missiles and the Soviet decision to break off the talks.
When bilateral negotiations resumed in 1985, they took on a very different character.
Instead of merely placing limits on the future size of nuclear arsenals, the eventual
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty abolished medium-range nuclear missiles
altogether. Furthermore, the Reagan and Bush administrations eventually cooperated with
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to go from the limitation of strategic arms to the concrete
reduction of arsenals, from SALT to START.
Ambrose fully notes the limitations (pardon the pun) of SALT, and carefully notes the
distinction between the SALT era and what came later, though he does conclude that “the
experience of SALT—its negotiation, the debates it triggered, and its repercussions—exerted
influence beyond the terms and expirations of the agreements themselves” (3) and “left
durable and important legacies for the control of nuclear armaments” (221). That last point
is true but debatable. The greatest weakness of the SALT process, as Ambrose’s assiduous
research shows, is that it was primarily about process rather than results. As with
contemporary policy in the Middle East, there is value in a peace process, but that is not
necessarily the same thing as peace. Outside of the ABM treaty, which did indeed keep the
Superpowers from developing extensive and potentially destabilizing defensive systems in
order to preserve mutually assured destruction (MAD), SALT’s basic thrust was control
through stable management rather than encouraging any fundamental changes in the
international system, about continuing the conversation rather than reaching any
conclusions. These were considered significant advances in a time when the smart money
believed that achieving stability was the best one could aspire to accomplish. After all, no
one ever expected the Cold War to end.
Knowing that more fundamental change was eventually possible places the
accomplishments of SALT and the détente era more generally in a different light. A great
deal of complex strategic thinking and planning from such brilliant theorists as Secretary of
State Henry Kissinger and statesmen such as President Richard Nixon and Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt went into maintaining stability. Celebrated at the time, all those efforts now
appear like the paddling of a swan across a placid lake, the furious activity below the
surface designed to make everything proceed with as little disruption as possible—no small
accomplishment, to be sure, but hardly heroic.
The development of the SALT process also encouraged the creation of a bipartisan arms
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control priesthood. Notwithstanding attacks from more hawkish politicians such as Senator
Henry ‘Scoop’ Jackson (D-WA) and his acolytes such as future Assistant Secretary of
Defense and arms control skeptic Richard Perle, who tried to derail it, or the efforts by
President Jimmy Carter to accelerate it beyond the political possible, prominent members of
both parties accepted the basic logic of the process, even if they differed on how hard a line
to take in negotiations. Thus, Secretaries of State as different as Cyrus Vance and Alexander
Haig advocated maintaining the process, and thus someone such as Paul Nitze could serve
both Democratic and Republic administrations in these negotiations. This was partially due
to a generalized approach to arms control that “treated nuclear weapons and the impact
they would have as primarily technological phenomena and saw only a diminished role for
geopolitics” (41). Such an approach privileged stability, focusing on the journey rather than
any particular destination, creating stagnation and calling it peace.
It is easy to be cynical about the accomplishments of the past and one should resist the
temptation here. One should not underestimate the importance of maintaining these arms
control discussions, both in their immediate time and in the role that they played in
contributing to the revolutionary changes in the later 1980s. Ambrose’s work is especially
valuable because of the way in which it both shows how the SALT process developed and
how it gradually broke down. The Reagan Administration changed the course of arms
control in large part because President Reagan himself questioned the logic of the SALT
process on two key points. First, he preferred to imagine reducing nuclear arsenals rather
than merely controlling their growth; and second, he advocated the development of
defensive systems to undermine the concept of MAD. This is not to credit Reagan with
prescience or omnipotence; Ambrose outlines very well how the Reagan Administration
struggled to define new policies. Although Reagan had wanted to engage the Soviets in
dialogue about reductions and became an advocate of ‘the zero option’ with regard to the
intermediate range weapons, he was neither willing nor able to break radically with the
SALT process from the start. Rather, it took a combination of geopolitical circumstances and
changes in administration personnel to manage the transition. Haig rejected zero because
he feared that would make negotiation impossible (182-3). His successor George Shultz, on
the other hand, was able both to speak the language of the arms control priesthood and also
work with President Reagan to develop constructive new policies in time for the emergence
of Mikhail Gorbachev as a new and equally creative interlocutor in Moscow. The end of the
SALT process thus led to the creation of the New World Order, and a new hope for a postCold War world that lasted almost two decades.
The Control Agenda charts these developments with scholarly aplomb in readable prose.
Ambrose makes very good use of the most recently available sources, including both the
newest volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States series on SALT I and SALT II,
and also the collections at the Ford, Carter, and Reagan Libraries, as well as the papers of
Paul Nitze. That source base, however, suffers from two significant lacunae that generally
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plague scholars in this area. First is the absence of significant sources from the Soviet side.
Although the subtitle proclaims this to be a history of the SALT talks, it is primarily a
discussion of the American debates about SALT. Soviet voices usually only appear indirectly,
through reports within the American documents of discussions with Soviet counterparts.
This is not a mortal sin, of course, since the book does what it chooses to do very well. Even
scholars with extensive connections and Russian language skills run into consistent
problems in accessing Soviet-era collections on nuclear arms. It is nevertheless a reminder
of the need for more work in that area.
A more significant problem, though also sadly common within the field these days, is its
heavy State Department focus to the exclusion of other actors within the American
government, especially the Department of Defense. In an era where so much of the
narrative traces the wrangling between State and Defense, one side’s voice comes out more
clearly. Here as well, structural forces play a significant role. The State Department does a
much better job of gathering and publishing its materials, both in the FRUS series and in its
manuscript collections in the National Archives. The Pentagon lags far behind, though the
[5]
volumes in the Secretaries of Defense Historical Series
offer the possibility of bringing
more primary documents from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the attention of
scholars. Secretaries of State have also been especially good at seizing the high ground in
the struggle for memoir supremacy—both Henry Kissinger and George Shultz produced
volumes of more than 1,000 pages—whereas Secretaries of Defense and even National
Security Advisers (outside of Henry Kissinger himself, and perhaps Zbigniew Brzezinski)
have been more reticent. The State Department’s relationship with the media and scholarly
community has also generally been much more extensive and positive, resulting in more
works told from the perspective of Foggy Bottom. Ambrose does his best to rectify that
imbalance through the use of National Security Council files, since so many differences
(especially during the Reagan years, when Secretary of Defense Weinberger sparred with
both Haig and Shultz) were aired in NSC meetings. As with the Soviet perspective, however,
readers hear of policy objections from the Pentagon only when they collide with the
positions of the diplomats, with less insight into the background of those positions. More
often than not, that leaves the Defense Department (and the intelligence community, which
also appears but fleetingly here) as an occasional roadblock or foil rather than a full
participant in and contributor to the ultimate policy decisions. With works like this as
encouragement, scholars can hope that future works will more fully integrate those other
perspectives to enrich our understanding of the sources and outcome of policy debates
between different stakeholders.
Those criticisms notwithstanding, Ambrose has produced a serious and thoughtful book that
deserves a wide audience within the ongoing scholarly dialogue about the efforts to forestall
Armageddon.
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Review by John Maurer, Yale University

I

n The Control Agenda, Matthew Ambrose has produced a solid summary of U.S. arms

limitation policy during the period of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) from 1966
to 1983. Drawing on the wealth of archival resources declassified over the past decade, The
Control Agenda provides a useful update to the previous hodge-podge of first-hand SALT
accounts. By providing a clear and accessible account of American arms control
deliberations, Ambrose helps place arms control at the center of our understanding of Cold
War politics, showing how arms control gradually expanded in importance on the American
political scene. By exploring SALT’s broader political significance, The Control Agenda will
draw scholarly attention to an arms control process that fundamentally shaped both the
conduct and the conclusion of the Cold War.
Ambrose’s account stretches from SALT’s genesis in the Lyndon Johnson Administration to
the breakdown of arms control talks during President Ronald Reagan’s first term. This is a
long period to cover, especially for such an incredibly complex subject matter – five
Presidential Administrations, covering the second half of the Cold War. The long time frame
allows Ambrose to trace major changes in nuclear strategy and arms control policy, from
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s assured destruction framework to the warfighting
strategy of the Reagan Administration. Ambrose’s work does for SALT what James
Cameron’s recent book did for anti-ballistic missile (ABM) technology, by tracing long-term
trends in U.S. arms control policy over a turbulent twenty-year period in American
[6]
history.
Ambrose’s examination shows how deeply enmeshed the entire U.S. foreign
policy process became in arms control deliberations.
Although covering the entire period from Johnson to Reagan, the bulk of Ambrose’s analysis
focuses on the Jimmy Carter Administration, which receives about half of the book’s length.
The details of negotiation in the Carter Administration are especially well done, describing
the rapid evolution of the Administration’s SALT policy, while also providing a valuable
timeline of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance’s major negotiating forays with Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko and Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin (108-141). This focus on the
Carter Administration, however, comes at the expense of other periods. For example, key
arms control breakthroughs from the tenure of Henry Kissinger like counting rules for
multiple warhead missiles are dealt with retrospectively in the Carter chapters, rather than
in the chapter on the Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford Administrations (124-128). The focus
on Carter does have some significant benefits as well: Ambrose does an excellent job
showing how key issues in the Reagan Administration’s Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
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(INF) Talks emerged from the SALT II negotiations in the Carter years, especially the
Soviets’ growing concern for U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles (137-142).
Ambrose deploys a wealth of new sources to interrogate and update previous journalistic
and memoir accounts of SALT. The Soviet perspective is also not ignored. Ambrose draws
upon Alexandr Savelyev and Nikolay Detinov’s arms control memoir The Big Five and Pavel
Podvig’s work on Soviet strategic technical capabilities to provide some insight into Soviet
[7]
decision-making at crucial moments.
The problem remains, however, that important
questions about SALT that lay behind much of the disputes at the time—for example, ‘Did
President X get a good deal in the negotiations or not?’—remain beyond our grasp, because
our understanding of the Soviet Union’s decision making about arms control remains so
murky. Given the dearth of Soviet sources, Ambrose’s emphasis is rightly on American SALT
policy, where a wealth of new information is available.
By incorporating these new American sources, Ambrose is able to provide an interesting
account of U.S. motives in SALT.
Superpower arms control has received some renewed attention recently because increasing
access to declassified sources has called into question the traditional account of SALT as a
[8]
cooperative exercise aimed at stabilizing mutual assured destruction (MAD).
Ambrose
usefully focuses attention on the domestic political imperatives of the arms control process.
Presidents from Johnson onwards found in arms control a policy issue that allowed them to
combine several major foreign and domestic concerns—U.S.-Soviet relations, NATO
planning, nuclear strategy, defense budgeting, intelligence analysis—and put them at the
center of American decision making. Only one person in the U.S. government sat at the
intersection of these differing issues: the President of the United States. SALT therefore
became an important tool for American Presidents to reassert their authority at a time when
executive power and Cold War foreign policy were under attack from all sides (6-7). As
Ambrose notes, the intensely secret and technical nature of SALT negotiations reflected his
basic preoccupation with sustaining and enhancing executive power.
Ambrose is at his best in enhancing our understanding of arms control’s larger place in
American politics. Because SALT developed as a tool to enhance executive power, the entire
SALT process was basically inimical to public opinion, a tool to shape the public, not
respond to it. This basic weakness caused a great deal of the furor surrounding SALT II,
when the Ford and Carter Administrations struggled to develop a compelling public
rationale for so secretive and technical a process. The end of SALT therefore had as much to
do with reconfigurations of the U.S. domestic political scene as it did with changing U.S.Soviet dynamics (217-218). Previous accounts have emphasized the Reagan Administration’s
public bellicosity and the general deterioration of U.S.-Soviet relations as decisive in ending
SALT. While not ignoring these factors, Ambrose contends that SALT ended and the
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Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) began when the Reagan Administration stopped
walling off public opinion from arms control, and instead saw how engaging with and
shaping public opinion could be an important asset for arms control negotiations, rather
than a liability. In Ambrose’s view, Reagan’s inability to manage his subordinates made
secret policymaking impossible, rendering the SALT policy process unworkable. Ironically,
the inability to formulate policy in secret ended up strengthening the Reagan
Administration’s hand in arms control negotiations by forcing it to build a broader public
consensus on its arms control policy proposals (218-219). Ambrose believes that this
broader public support fed back into the U.S.-Soviet negotiations, strengthening the ability
of American negotiators to stand firm on proposals, even during the Soviet walk-outs of late
1983, and incentivizing the Kremlin to make concessions of their own (210-214).
Ambrose has a harder time in showing the influence of SALT on U.S. nuclear strategy
during the period. His account sketches out how SALT paved the way for the United States’
to pursue more flexible nuclear targeting policy during the second half of the Cold War,
from initial consideration in the Nixon Administration to its full flowering during Reagan’s
first term. In Ambrose’s telling, SALT’s emphasis on the technical details of nuclear arsenals
stimulated strategic thinking from the early 1970s onwards. In this way, SALT caused the
shift in nuclear counterforce targeting from the large-scale counterforce attacks of the
1950s and 1960s to the controlled precision attacks of the 1970s and 1980s (219-220).
Ambrose’s account of nuclear targeting highlights important aspects of how SALT enabled
new thinking about nuclear counterforce in the 1970s. For example, by limiting the
deployment of ballistic missiles while allowing the proliferation of multiple warhead and
cruise missiles, SALT constructed a strategic environment uniquely favorable to
counterforce attacks, as increasingly-accurate warheads proliferated significantly faster
than targets (56-58).
While arms control enabled the emergence of new counterforce targeting, it is less clear
that SALT caused this development in strategy. Previous accounts of the evolution of U.S.
nuclear targeting, including Terry Terriff’s The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S.
Nuclear Strategy, Ted Greenwood’s Making the MIRV, and Donald Mackenzie’s Inventing
Accuracy, have emphasized that the roots of American precision counterforce targeting
[9]
reached back into the 1960s, prior to the commencement of SALT.
More recent accounts
of the evolution of U.S. nuclear targeting, including Francis Gavin’s Nuclear Statecraft,
Brendan Green and Austin Long’s “The Geopolitical Origins of U.S. Hard-Target-Kill
Counterforce Capabilities and MIRV,” and Niccolo Petrelli and Giordana Pulcini’s “Nuclear
Superiority in the Age of Parity,” have also emphasized the independent roots of the
[10]
accuracy-counterforce concept.
All of this suggests that counterforce targeting evolved
in tandem with SALT, rather than being caused by it.
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It is more likely the case that the desire for new counterforce targeting shaped SALT at
certain points, rather than the other way around. For example, in the summer of 1971,
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer explained to Nixon that arms
control to limit the quantitative arms race would enable the United States to pursue greater
advantages in the qualitative arms race, like multiple warheads and accuracy
[11]
improvements.
This suggests that the alignment of the SALT process with American
counterforce objectives may not have been a coincidence. Rather, American leaders used
SALT as a vehicle for promoting U.S. nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union. The
agreement proposed by Packard in the summer of 1971 sounds suspiciously like that
promoted by conservative critics of SALT II, which also bears striking similarities to the
terms of START I: strict limits on the size of missiles; steep reduction in the number of
launchers; and continued proliferation of multiple warheads and accuracy improvements.
While Ambrose’s account of the domestic political disjuncture between SALT and START is
convincing, significant continuities existed between them in U.S. nuclear strategy. American
leaders in both SALT and START sought to promote U.S. nuclear advantage over the Soviet
Union, even at the height of arms control negotiations.
By providing such an accessible account of nuclear arms control, Ambrose’s The Control
Agenda is an important contribution to the history of the Cold War. Covering a wide expanse
of time and demonstrating the importance of arms control negotiations to the evolution of
U.S. foreign policy and domestic politics, Ambrose makes a strong case for incorporating
SALT and START more directly into our narratives of the later stages of the Cold War.
Highlighting the importance of arms control is especially useful as historians continue to
revise our understanding of the Cold War’s end. The arms control process begun in SALT
was a key factor in negotiating the end of the decades-long military confrontation between
the United States and the Soviet Union. The Control Agenda thus represents required
reading for anyone seeking to understand the role played by superpower negotiations in
managing the nuclear balance of terror.
Review by Luke A. Nichter, Texas A&M University–Central Texas

O

n the afternoon of Wednesday, 27 June 2018, I was on the elevator on the way up to

the 26th floor of 350 Park Avenue. The destination was Kissinger Associates, Inc. I had
recently read the fine monograph by Matthew J. Ambrose, The Control Agenda: A History of
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. By coincidence, I was about to meet a principal figure
in the work I was preparing to review. Dr. Kissinger had agreed to discuss two subjects I
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have been working on, 1) Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and 2) the 1968 presidential election. I
had submitted my questions the week before–not because I was forbidden from asking
others but because I wanted to make sure he had time to think about them.
On the elevator, the idea popped into my head to go slightly off script. The change of plans
was inspired by the review of this book that I had been working on as well as some things I
had heard Kissinger say in the time since I first stepped off that elevator and into his office
almost ten years earlier to the day. For historians, his more recent remarks present a
challenge. Kissinger’s thirty-five hundred pages of memoirs were written ages ago, as were
interviews he gave in which he marked off his policy turf and, according to some people who
were close to President Richard Nixon, took more than his fair share of credit for various
initiatives. Perhaps the most famous of these interviews was one with Italian journalist
Oriana Fallaci in November 1972, in which Kissinger characterized himself as a lone cowboy
[12]
riding a horse into town.
For years, when asked how he could work for someone like
Nixon, the general tenor of Kissinger’s response was you must understand how difficult it
was to work for that man. These were the remarks of someone who was still relatively
young, vulnerable, ambitious, longed for acceptance, and had a career ahead of him.
Since my last visit, Kissinger has aged more than a decade. He is wiser and, as a result, his
view of his role in historic events has taken on a greater sense of proportion. Rather than
separate himself from Nixon, he has sought to be more closely associated with him. During
the 2014 Nixon/Ford Annual White House Reunion, held in November at the Metropolitan
Club in Washington, D.C., Kissinger said during lunchtime remarks that he owed everything
to Nixon and that those were the best years of his life. That was the first staff reunion that
Kissinger had ever attended, forty years after Nixon resigned in disgrace. During Kissinger’s
95th birthday celebration on 19 June 2018 at Neue Gallerie in New York, the week before I
met with him, he went even further to say that of the eleven presidents he had worked with,
Nixon was the most brilliant. Whether one agrees with him or not, or approves of policies
made during his time in government, few Americans have had the ability to make such as
assessment.
During my meeting with him, I decided that I had to address Kissinger’s unique role in the
making of U.S. foreign policy in light of his recent remarks, in addition to the specific
subjects I planned to raise. When Richard Moss and I had met him ten years earlier, he was
still somewhat unsettled and edgy. When we took out our cell phones to silence them before
[13]
the start of the meeting, he barked “no recording devices.”
As I think Rick would attest,
we were not only not greeted very warmly, we were hardly greeted at all. Ten years later,
this time was different. Kissinger seemed to be at peace with himself, more grandfatherly,
and comfortable with the new proportionality of his role in history. Since finishing my Ph.D.
in 2008, I have not had another conversation that felt more like I was meeting my academic
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advisor. When our half hour was over and his scheduler entered to interrupt, he turned to
me and said with a wry grin, “The problem is they don’t kick out the people I want to kick
[14]
out. Stay for a few more minutes.”
It was my moment. I stepped into the batter’s box and took a cut at the first pitch. “Looking
far into the future, decades from now when I am an old man, what should be written about
your role in the Nixon administration?” I asked. His eyes studied me carefully, but he made
no movement at all. His head started to nod forward while he closed his eyes, almost as if he
was stealing a moment of rest. His hands, folded in front of him, became loose. We were the
only ones in his office and the door was closed. My eyes caught a glance of a framed
photograph of him in the Nixon Oval Office on the end table to the right. Behind him was a
photograph I did not remember from my previous visit, of Kissinger with then Secretary of
State John Kerry.
For a moment I thought Kissinger had dozed off, except when he came to he was aware of
everything I had said and promptly addressed it. He had been searching his memory and
preparing his answer. His chin rose, his head leveled off, and his hands resumed their
position in front of him. Kissinger’s eyes opened and resumed their study of me. “I played a
central role in a number of creative initiatives, but Nixon was the president,” he said. It was
a perfect answer, yet so obviously different from his earlier writings and interviews. It
reflected the new sense of proportion that his remarks have had in recent years. The
challenge for scholars is to accurately frame Kissinger’s role going forward, since the vast
majority of the records he has left us were written before he assumed this new sense of
proportion.
This meeting was immediately on my mind as I re-read Matthew J. Ambrose’s The Control
Agenda: A History of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. It is one of the best first
monographs I have read. It is tight, well-written, well-edited, thoroughly researched for the
story it tells, and, most of all, it is unimpeachably balanced in its treatment of the subject
and the individuals involved, including Kissinger. Ambrose argues that the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations “took place in an era with important parallels to the
present,” including “the threat of ‘decline’” and “the threat of economic stagnation” (4).
Ambrose quickly traces the history of the talks during the Nixon years in order to get to the
most original part of the book, the fresh content on the Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and
Ronald Reagan years. Ultimately, détente failed because “like a broken bone not properly
set, it began to heal around a partially dysfunctional system of technologies and doctrines”
(216).
Over time, détente became a watchword for failure and disappointment. Conservative critics
of the Nixon White House thought the United States gave away too much while making an
agreement with the Soviets that allowed them room to cheat (126). In 1976, Jimmy Carter
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ran, in part, against Gerald Ford on a “sophisticated critique of détente that was still
accessible to voters” (81). Yet, under President Carter, “the president who best understood
the details of the SALT negotiations” (217), Ambrose argues convincingly, “critical
continuities in the SALT process remained and accelerated” (80). Therefore, is it possible
that détente’s downfall has been greatly exaggerated? Even after the failure to ratify SALT
II, Ambrose shows how the ideas of SALT and détente continued into the future. “SALT left
durable and important legacies for the control of nuclear armaments,” he concludes (221).
This volume is timely and serves as a lesson for current policymakers that unless you know
where you have been, you do not know where you are going. In light of debates over the
Obama-era nuclear agreement with Iran and ongoing discussions regarding U.S.-North
Korea relations, Ambrose’s emphasis on the importance of verification issues is again
relevant. As compliance issues vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was an issue that vexed
administrations since the Eisenhower White House, the subject again comes into focus.
Tricks more recently employed in this area by all sides seem less surprising when reading
Ambrose’s description of their historical antecedents. We have avoided nuclear Armageddon
once already, and this book might help us to avoid it again.
In this reviewer’s opinion, the most admirable asset of the volume is that it takes a highly
technical, complex subject and makes it palatable for a more general readership. I distinctly
remember, at an early stage in what became Richard Nixon and Europe: The Reshaping of
[15]
the Postwar Atlantic World¸
trying to decide which subjects to cover and which to leave
out. After slogging through the details of monetary regimes and the fracturing of Bretton
Woods in 1971, I had no appetite at all for getting into defense-related issues, including
offset, numerous Mansfield Amendments, FRELOC (the costs of moving NATO headquarters
to Belgium), Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, and, among others, SALT.
I have listened to just about every conversation on the Nixon tapes related to SALT. On a
regular basis, they had trouble understanding the subject. When assembling the two
[16]
volumes on the tapes that I published with Douglas Brinkley,
we could not convince our
editor, the estimable Bruce Nichols, to include a single conversation related to SALT. We
decided the subject was too impenetrable for the average reader. Thankfully, Matthew
Ambrose is not the average author.
Every criticism I could think of about the work, even if the author had been available during
preparation of the book to address every omission, would have taken Ambrose away from
his purpose. The book details with intrinsically complicated subjects, yet the book is very
readable, in part due to subject headings every few pages that provide a sense of tempo. I
would have preferred a more straight-forward chronological presentation. I found myself
wanting to quickly compare Nixon to Carter, or Carter to Reagan, and it was not easy to do
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so in the more thematic approach used. At the same time, what I propose would probably
have been less readable than the finished volume we have. I would like to have seen some
original material from the Nixon tapes. The term “SALT” appears a minimum of 348 times,
and only a fraction have been transcribed or published in any way. The book seems to have
been weighted more heavily towards one administration, Nixon’s, than the ones where the
greatest quantity of new content is available.
The book could have greatly benefitted from original interviews. Official oral history
interviews might contain fresh memories, but rarely candid ones. Interviewees are still
working, sometimes still in government (or might be again someday), and the people or
policies they would like to critique are still living or remain sensitive. Original interviews
allow one to triangulate between oral histories, declassified records, and memoirs. Figures
like Kissinger–or Jimmy Carter, or Walter Mondale, or Richard Allen, or George Shultz, and
others still with us – have had a long time to think about this subject. Historians could gain
from the evolution of their understanding, especially in the post-Watergate period when it
seems less material of substance made it to a paper record that could one day be discovered
in an archive by a historian.
While reading, too many times I wondered how SALT affected other policies, such as the
Helsinki Accords, rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and domestic
politics. “Carter felt the need to wall off certain issues” (220), Ambrose writes, but we
cannot afford to wall off our understanding. But going into any of these in much detail would
have taken the work off course. Watergate was not centrally about “campaign finance
scandals” (80). Was Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev really as debilitated in 1974 as
Ambrose suggests? He sounds pretty sharp on the Nixon tapes the year before. Ambrose
points out that “Kissinger noted Nixon’s tendency to become ‘glassy-eyed and irritable’
during extended debates” (27). The tapes tell a different story, and, as indicated earlier, so
does Kissinger these days. Today, Kissinger 2.0 might say something like I had the freedom
to do what I did because of who the president was. Of course, these critiques are made by a
gadfly Nixon aficionado and are not intended to diminish an otherwise fine work. It is not
my book, and I could not have done it as well.
As I was leaving Kissinger’s office, I had a final moment with him. He asked me to hand him
his cane, which had fallen to the ground to his right. As I reached for it, I realized that he
has now lived ninety-five percent of a century. However you manipulate the numbers, that is
a long time to think about your place in history. Henry Kissinger’s intellectual journey
continues, and he seems comfortable with the destination. Perhaps he will continue to revise
his thinking, and historians need to be aware of this. I am excited to see what comes next.
For that reason, my parting words were, “I’ll come back and visit you after your hundredth
birthday.” He looked up and smiled. One would hope to see a similar smile if he read The
Control Agenda; it humanizes a highly technical process and those involved, warts and all.
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Review by David Tal, University of Sussex

I

n this well researched and finely articulated book Matthew Ambrose provides us with a

broad interpretation of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) and beyond. He values
SALT as an exercise in halting the arms race that failed, in the context of détente, and a
laboratory that served future arms control negotiations. The failure of SALT, argues
Ambrose, helped to make things better in the next rounds of the arms control negotiations.
Ambrose places SALT within the wider context of détente, while assigning détente with the
role suggested already by Jeremi Suri, as a mean to maintain the political status quo in the
United States and Europe—west and east—in the face of the spreading unrest during the
[17]
stormy late 1960s.
Ambrose is interested more in the grand scheme of things than in the
nuts and bolts of the SALT deliberations. Perhaps due to space limits, Ambrose discusses
SALT in broad brush strokes, although he does not neglect to discuss details and people,
where due. Thus, we can learn about the forces behind SALT, the ideas and interests that
drove them, and the path SALT was taking across the years. Still, there is more forest here
than trees - and this is not necessarily bad thing.
While disqualified to judge the next rounds of the arm control negotiations that took place in
the aftermath of the two rounds of SALT (1969-1979), I feel that I can contribute to the
[18]
discussion on SALT, based on the book I published on this topic.
And here, I am not sure
about several points made by Ambrose. First is the idea of ‘linkage’, the argument that SALT
was connected to and was part of détente. Like many before him, Ambrose reiterates the
idea that President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were convinced
that the Soviets were more interested than the United States in SALT, and hence, it would
be possible, through ‘linkage,’ to exact a price from the Soviet Union in different places in
return for SALT. Ambrose contends that the notion of ‘linkage’ was weakening (29), but his
scanty and incomplete treatment of the meaning of the linkage is evident even in the small
details. Thus, the delay in the opening of the talks on the limitation of strategic arms was
not the result of Nixon and Kissinger’s sheer reluctance to “set a date too soon” (36), but
because Nixon and (mainly) Kissinger tried to exact a price from the Soviet Union in return
for the beginning of the talks. However, they failed, and it was the first sign to things to
come, as the ‘linkage’ actually collapsed very quickly. As I have shown both in my book, and
[19]
more specifically in an article on this subject,
it was pretty soon that Nixon and
Kissinger began to treat SALT in dissociation from other détente-related issues, as did
President Jimmy Carter.
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In this context, I also disagree with Ambrose’s suggestion that Nixon showed little interest
in the intricacies of SALT. Ambrose cites Kissinger’s often quoted statement about Nixon
becoming “glassy-eyed” when discussing SALT, but in doing so, he ignores the plethora of
documents showing Nixon’s deep and thorough involvement in the shaping, making, and
advancing of SALT. The National Security Council (NSC) discussions were never really
about details, but about broad issues, and Nixon was a lively and active participant, at least
until Watergate started to take its toll. On the other hand, Ambrose attributes great
importance to Paul Nitze, described by Ambrose as “distinguished figure in the national
security world for over twenty years” (7) in the making of SALT. He argues that “Nitze
helped shape the SALT process and its legacies more than almost any single individual” (7).
This is a suggestion for a whole new reading of SALT and what it was about, and I must
admit that this is not my reading. Nitze was the Department of Defence’s representative in
the American delegation to SALT I, under the leadership of Gerard Smith. He might have
played a role at a post SALT era, but during the negotiations on SALT, he was a member of
the delegation that hardly played a role in the making of SALT. Its role was mainly working
on the fine letters of the ideas originating from Washington D.C. that were the outcome of
mainly Nixon and Kissinger’s thoughts and ideas. Nitze let his opinions of SALT be known,
usually in opposition to Nixon and Kissinger’s, but his actual contribution to the making of
the Nixon/Kissinger arms control policy was negligible. In fact, it is possible to write the
history of SALT without mentioning Nitze even once and the study would be just as much
complete.
I disagree also with the way Ambrose treats the negotiations over the limitation on AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) systems. He acknowledges its role as a bargaining chip, but does not
discuss the depth and true meaning of that. According to Ambrose, the negotiators started
to discuss the limit or ban on ABM systems almost accidentally (45ff), while in fact, the ABM
limit was a major pillar of the American SALT policy. It was already during the days of the
Johnson administration that the defence establishment, with Robert McNamara in its head,
concluded that the Sentinel/Safeguard were ineffective and not worth their price,
economically and strategically. This notion was crucial to what followed, because Nixon and
those around him held to the same view, and once the Soviets realized too, that the ABM
would not really provide them protection against nuclear attack, the path to SALT opened
wide. With that, the ABM became Nixon’s prime tool in getting an agreement that would put
a cap on the offensive strategic missiles. The Johnson administration made a calculated
decision to stop building large intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and to invest
money in smaller but more efficient nuclear weapons like the multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) and later the cruise missiles. President Nixon and his
successors adhered to that decision, and since they had no leverage over the Soviets to
convince them to stop developing large ICBMs, the ABMs, which the Soviets wanted to see
curbed, became a prime means of trade-off. In other words, Nixon struggled energetically to
get the money for a system he was determined to extinguish.
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I also wonder about Ambrose’s treatment of the forward-based systems (FBS). He argues
that the Soviets did not discuss nuclear weapons by categories, “comparing the respective
stockpiles of each side,” and instead “defined any weapon capable of striking Soviet soil as
threatening,” which led to the inclusion of the United States’ European allies into the
equation (44). Both the United States and the Soviet Union compared various kinds of
weapons, discussing the impact of each, discussions that affected the numbers each
category could have. In addition to that, the Soviets also demanded to include the FBS into
the equation. But these were not exclusive, that is, either this or that. Problematic also is
Ambrose’s description of the debate over the meaning of strategic weapons in the context of
the FBS controversy. Ambrose bases his explanation of the meaning of strategic weapons on
[20]
the ideas of Lawrence Freedman, that is, on a secondary source.
But there is a primary
source that tells us what the protagonists suggested should be included in the strategic
package. In the first meeting of the American and Soviet delegations to SALT, the head of
the American delegation, Gerhard Smith, claimed that strategic weapons were those with
intercontinental abilities, while his Soviet counterpart, Vladimir Semenov, argued that each
weapon system that could threaten the other side should be considered as strategic
[21]
weapon.
Problematic is also the somewhat diminutive role Ambrose allocates to the backchannel
between Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. Using descriptions such as
“Kissinger’s attempts to bypass the U.S. diplomatic apparatus…”; “Kissinger’s attempts to
negotiate alone with the upper echelons of the Soviet government…”; “The effects of the
backchannel on the SALT negotiations […] were primarily restricted to the issues of
submarines and summit negotiations” (47) (italics mine), Ambrose implies that the
backchannel was Kissinger’s initiative, on which he embarked, with more or less success, on
his own. This is not the case. Kissinger did not attempt to negotiate—he did negotiate. He
did not attempt to negotiate alone—he negotiated with the full knowledge and blessing of
the president. Ambrose’s last statement here is the most astonishing, as Kissinger and
Dobrynin discussed everything—the ABM limit agreement, limits on offensive weapons—all
of them, and all the other topics that the American and Soviet delegations later turned into
articles and clauses. Part of the explanation for the differences in view and perspective lay, I
think, in the fact that Ambrose did not exhaust all the available sources pertinent to SALT,
such as those deposited in the Nixon presidential library and the national archives, as well
as the Digital National Security Archives collection. Using them might have led to different
conclusions.
Ambrose’s book neglects one conspicuous feature of both Nixon and Carter’s SALT policy, at
least in the early stages of their administrations: both sought to re-invent the wheel. Nixon
completely ignored the history of SALT that started with the Johnson administration, only to

Citation: George Fujii. H-Diplo Roundtable XX-20 on Matthew J. Ambrose. The Control Agenda: A History of the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks. H-Diplo. 01-14-2019.
https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/3561266/h-diplo-roundtable-xx-20-matthew-j-ambrose-control-agenda-history
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 United States License.

19

H-Diplo

return to its fundamentals, in the face of the Soviet resistance to Nixon’s innovative ideas,
while Carter tried to turn the past status-quo based agreements, mainly the Vladivostok
agreement (1974) into a true arm reduction agreement, once again, to turn back to the path
paved from his by his predecessors.
However, more than details and points of disagreement, I would argue that the major
difference between Ambrose’s book and mine is historiographical. As mentioned above,
Ambrose discusses SALT within the wider context of U.S. nuclear strategy, referring more
than once to the allusive concept of ‘deterrence’ and as a mean to achieve controlled arms
control. For failing to achieve that, Ambrose regards SALT as flawed (216). My
understanding of SALT is different. The negotiations were never about actual reduction or
limitation of contemporary strategic arms. At the most, they led to the dismantling of
weapons that were nonetheless obsolete. Where it mattered, the maximum they aimed to
achieve was putting a cap on the strategic arms race, and even that, as the SALT I and SALT
II showed, without forcing the signatories to give up actual strategic weapons. “We are
giving up nothing,” insisted Kissinger when he tried to convince Senators to support SALT,
[22]
and it was not just a sale-phrase.
The Soviets could say the same thing to their audience.
In the case of SALT II, it even meant an increase in the number of offensive weapons. That
is, the agreements aimed to give the sides a sense of equality in weapons’ numbers or
quality and would not force them to engage in a costly arms race. The negotiations and
agreements did not lead, and were not aimed to lead, to the end of the development of more
destructive and more powerful strategic arms. The development of MIRV and cruise missiles
is an example to that. And so, while American and Soviet teams were negotiating to put a
cap on the number of ICBMs each side could hold, the United States and the Soviet Union
were already developing the next generation of more powerful, more accurate, and more
destructive nuclear weapons. So, what was the point of the negotiations that preoccupied
the Nixon and Carter administrations (and their Soviet counterparts) for so many years? To
best understand the SALT process, and process it was- the T in SALT can be used both as
Treaty and Talks, we need to look at SALT as an economic and strategic project, aiming to
preserve the status quo in a way that would allow its signatories to stop investing in arm
systems that were considered as obsolete, for the sake of new and more innovative arms
systems, without being looked at as weak. It was the no-longer-useful ABM for the new
MIRV or cruise missile.
Author’s Response by Matthew Ambrose, U.S. Government Accountability Oﬃce

I

am grateful to the authors of the above reviews for engaging so thoughtfully with my
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book. Nuclear arms control is far from an uplifting subject, but the insights and criticisms
brought by Ronald Granieri, John Maurer, Luke Nichter, and David Tal, as well as Scot
Kauffman in his introduction, speak to its continuing importance.
The reviewers have done an excellent job highlighting the themes of the book and raised
several interesting points. Ronald Granieri was especially apt in emphasizing that the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) were a process, much like the Middle-East peace
process. While such processes have benefits, those watching in real time might find the
experience a bit like watching paint dry. Because SALT was more important as a process
than a set of results, he finds the importance of SALT’s legacies “debatable.”
I take Granieri’s point that substantive products of SALT negotiations are much smaller
today than successful negotiations like the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I)
and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). But SALT’s status as a ‘failure’
despite the incredible political capital dedicated to it, is part of what makes it so significant.
It is said that individuals learn more from failures than from their successes. This may not
be completely true for diplomatic history, but I think large-scale failures show historians
different things. At a minimum, SALT was the main experience from which negotiators in
those future successful negotiations could draw. It loomed large their minds, even if it is
less evident today.
Several of the reviewers also point out that, despite some efforts to analyze the Soviet
perspective, the book is primarily about the American experience of SALT. It is a fair cop.
While some oral histories and English-language works like that of Alexander Savalyev and
[23]
Nikolai Detinov
exist, a comprehensive account of both sides’ experience remains to be
written, and would be extremely valuable. I fear it may not be possible barring a major
change in the character of the Russian government. In particular, Russian citizens
researching nuclear issues have faced jail time for possessing, let alone publishing,
[24]
information that was at one point publicly available.
Luke Nichter and David Tal suggest, in different ways, that I have underrated President
Richard Nixon’s direct role in SALT negotiations, particularly SALT I, and it is an interesting
question. My book presents Nixon as an important overseer, establishing the general
direction and developing some sense of where SALT belonged in his broader foreign policy,
but not being deeply involved in details beyond a certain point. I do spend far more time
exploring Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s understanding of these more complicated
issues. Nichter shows that Kissinger himself has backed away from his egocentric accounts
of earlier decades and now readily admits that Nixon was the central figure on most issues.
Tal asserts that Nixon was a “lively and active” participant in National Security Council
(NSC) debates on SALT, and that Nixon was deeply engaged in SALT issues.
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I agree with Tal, to an extent. In NSC transcripts Nixon indeed seems lively and active. His
comments also seem to me glib and shallow, and not evidence of a sophisticated grasp of all
of the technological and doctrinal issues at play. Tal himself states that NSC meetings were
not really about details anyway. If one believes, as I do, that the working out of these
technical details is central to SALT’s historical import, then Nixon’s contributions here are
appropriately rated. To the extent that Nixon was making decisions about the timing of
negotiations, empowering personnel, and managing the domestic politics of SALT, he was
indeed quite interested. He also signed off on many of the substantive elements of the U.S.
position to be presented in negotiation. But this is endorsing the work of others, and rarely
did Nixon make a decision about the substance and terms of SALT against Kissinger’s
advice.
I am not the first to find Nixon an important but somewhat inscrutable figure. He was
clearly intelligent, but not an intellectual. He lacked many of the typical extroverted
attributes of successful politicians, yet his political success, regardless of the ends he
sought, was undeniable. He is a difficult figure to psychologize, and his mindset is a moving
target as he gradually descended into resentment and paranoia in his final years in office.
As it stands, however, these were his main contributions to the substance of SALT I in
particular.
John Maurer questions the level of influence arms control had on the development of
counter-force doctrines in the 1970s and 1980s. The works he cites present an interesting
counter-narrative. I do not mean to provide a monocausal explanation for these doctrines by
any means, nor to deny these concepts’ intellectual lineage, which was quite distinct from
arms control. I do hope that readers come away from this book with a sense of how
significant the notion of ‘arms control’ was during this era for anyone working on nuclear
issues. I believe that historians have failed to pick up on this significance because SALT
especially was so complicated and sprawling, which makes it very difficult to integrate into
a historical narrative about a different, but related subject. Regardless of complexity, these
negotiations were an almost overwhelming aspect of U.S. national security debates, so much
so that their discontinuation in 1983 brought millions of people into the streets and raised
fears of nuclear war to a fever pitch. Defense planners and policymakers were acutely aware
of these pressures, and they seeped into every aspect of their planning, even if planners
resented them or found them overblown.
Maurer also raises an interesting point when he states that “American leaders used SALT as
a vehicle for promoting U.S. nuclear advantage.” The use of arms control as a vehicle for
pursuing competitive advantage has been a subject of much of Maurer’s work, and it is a
fascinating lens through which to consider the SALT experience. No doubt many people
pursued SALT or SALT-like negotiations for many different reasons, and the more credulous
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and earnest supporters likely did not see it this way. But when looking at structural
outcomes, he may have a point. The weakest agreement in terms of securing a U.S.
advantage, SALT II, went down in defeat, after all.
The United States was not alone in this pursuit. Who should benefit and what the relative
nuclear standings should be following an agreement were central questions in SALT, and
the Soviet concept of the ‘correlation of forces’ often seemed to imply that, since they
believed their military and economic power to be on the upswing, the results of any arms
control agreement ought to be tilted in their favor as well.
I worry that such a perspective might sap such agreements of the legitimacy both sides
clearly thought they conveyed. How a country can achieve its arms control goals while
preserving this legitimacy and securing the assent of the other party thus becomes a
complex dance of realist security concerns and constructivist thinking.
I especially enjoyed reading Tal’s review, by one of the few other scholars to have written
specifically on SALT, to see where our views align and where they diverge. Tal calls my
treatment of Nixon and Kissinger’s early attempts at ‘linkage’ “scanty and incomplete.” I did
not dedicate much space to the administration’s early attempts to delay the negotiations out
of a belief that the Soviets might provide concessions in other areas. The policy fell flat
within a few months due to domestic political pressure and the Soviets’ unwillingness to
play along. Tal’s book on SALT dedicates considerable space to this doomed effort, and it is
[25]
quite informative.
I wonder, however, if this is not a point better made about the nature
of détente, of which SALT was initially only a part, before becoming something else. As I see
it, the purpose of my book is to chart how SALT could take on a life of its own. Despite the
difference in emphasis, however, Tal and I still come to the same conclusion, that SALT I
was remarkably resistant to influence from outside events or attempts to leverage it against
other issues.
Tal also argues my treatment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) Treaty negotiations
suggests that U.S. officials had not seriously considered the importance of ABM systems in
the strategic balance prior to entering negotiations. To clarify: just because the issue came
up in formal negotiations before the delegation had an authorized position to share, that
does not mean the U.S. government did not have strong views on the subject; only that it
had no plan for how to broach it with the Soviet delegation. He also states that “Nixon
struggled energetically to get the money for a system he was determined to extinguish.”
This is not a major revelation. After Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s failure at the
Glassboro summit, he relented to the establishment of the Sentinel ABM system but
continued to push for controls on ABMs and ballistic missiles. This relationship between
offense and defense was always apparent, as was the idea that defense would almost
certainly lose out in the bargain. The Nixon team never attempted to deny this connection
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but wanted to leave open the terms of the trade.

[26]

For a history of the entire SALT process, focusing too much on ABM systems would be
beside the point. The technology was less advanced and less widespread than ballistic
missiles in 1969. Once ABMs were limited to very low levels, they were a settled issue from
1972-1983. Yet still the talks continued, because ABMs were not what motivated nations to
pursue arms control at a gut level. Nuclear weapons (and their delivery systems) did. The
ABM Treaty established some common assumptions, but offensive forces ought to remain
the heart of the story.
Tal also believes I understate the import of the Kissinger-Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin
backchannel. It is wrong to over-attribute the structure of SALT I to the backchannel just
because much of the agreements came up for discussion there. If the backchannel had not
been opened, or used in a limited fashion, the basic outlines of SALT I would likely have
been the same. Trading off a de-facto ban on ABMs for a cap on offensive forces was first
proposed by McNamara in 1967, and Tal admits that the Nixon administration worked its
way back to this position despite early attempts to the contrary. Giving Kissinger and his
backchannel the majority of the credit then feeds into Kissinger’s belief that only statesmen
could cut through the bureaucratic morass to achieve lasting agreements.
If we are to talk of the impact of the backchannel, we should focus on how the use of a
secret, unofficial one ultimately shaped the agreements. And the simple fact is that
Kissinger made mistakes. He made mistakes because he operated with limited staff support
and without the awareness of the interagency. He made well-documented mistakes on
submarine-launched ballistic missiles that would have been easily caught by involving other
agencies or departments. On the eve of the 1972 Moscow summit, the official and unofficial
channels converged, but their meeting was more like a car crash, because neither was fully
aware of what the other had already agreed to. Yet when criticism of SALT I’s terms started
to come out of Congress, Kissinger had no problem blaming the arms control bureaucracy
for the agreement’s shortcomings.
Tal also states that I neglected to describe Nixon and President Jimmy Carter’s early
attempts to “reinvent the wheel.” I find this puzzling. Given that the Nixon administration
had only abstract studies and a single failed summit to go on, their efforts might better be
described as ‘constructing the wheel.’ As for the Carter administration, I dedicate the fourth
chapter of my book to a period of less than three months in which Carter tried and failed to
force a radical break from the framework for SALT II he had inherited from Ford.
Tal believes my treatment of negotiator and defense intellectual Paul Nitze is out of
proportion to his significance, going so far as to say he could be safely ignored without
harming the narrative. While Nitze’s impact on the structure of SALT I was limited to
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technical details, it was the beginning of a prolonged engagement, both political and
intellectual, that had significant repercussions. His opportunities to negotiate independently
on difficult subjects in SALT I set the template for his later ‘Walk in the Woods’ gambit in
1982. We think of one of SALT II’s main legacies as its failure to be ratified. Nitze was one
of the most prominent voices against SALT II, and one of the key members of the Committee
on the Present Danger, significantly influencing the positions on the treaty that organization
ultimately took. Nitze then had the opportunity to build constructively on these criticisms in
the INF talks. Nitze was both a significant actor in the life of these negotiations, and a
bellwether for attitudes on arms control and the strategic balance, especially if we continue
the story through 1983, as I do. Ignoring him makes it far more difficult to understand the
strategic, doctrinal, and political issues that SALT continued to raise. SALT was
controversial in its time, and ultimately failed. If we study only the views of those
negotiating it and fail to engage meaningfully with those who grew into critics, we will miss
essential elements of SALT’s historical significance and the causes of its failure.
Finally, and in keeping with that point, I am surprised that none of the reviewers took issue
with my periodization. I argue that the first three years of the INF negotiations bore a
greater resemblance to the SALT negotiations than they did to the more fruitful negotiations
that came after. I confess that carrying the story of SALT through 1983 was met with some
skepticism by my colleagues and editors when I first proposed it. Given the reviewers’
responses, however, I am hopeful that I have achieved my aim. In contrast to those who see
1981 and the rise of President Ronald Reagan as the decisive break with regard to arms
control, I hope that future scholars will see the years 1981-1983 as an important time of
trial in which many of the issues of the 1970s were finally allowed to come to a head. To
paraphrase Winston Churchill, we should not look at the failure of ratification in 1979 as the
end of SALT, but rather, as the beginning of the end.
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